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Developing country sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as players in the world foreign direct 
investment (FDI) market have received considerable attention. While outward FDI from 
emerging markets has indeed risen dramatically,1 that by SWFs has been negligible: their 
outward FDI stock is around US$ 100 billion (compared to a world FDI stock of US$ 20 trillion 
in 2010).2 
 
On the other hand, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)3 -- another class of state-controlled entities 
(SCEs) -- are serious players in the world FDI market. UNCTAD identified more than 650 SOEs 
that are multinational enterprises (MNEs).4 They hail from both emerging markets and 
developed countries.5 (There are also many important financial SOEs that are MNEs.) 
 
                                                        
* Karl P. Sauvant (karlsauvant@gmail.com) is Senior Fellow, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International 
Investment (VCC), Columbia Law School/The Earth Institute, Columbia University; Jonathan Strauss 
(jmstrauss01@gmail.com) is a former Fellow of VCC and is currently completing an LL.M. in Law and 
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1 See e.g., Karl P. Sauvant et al., eds., Foreign Direct Investment from Emerging Markets (New York: Macmillan, 
2010). 
2  UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011). 
3 Following UNCTAD, ibid., p. 28, “SOEs” are defined as enterprises in which the government has a controlling 
interest, with “control” defined as a stake of 10% or more of voting power. Ownership can be direct or indirect 
(including through e. g. government-controlled pension funds, other government-owned firms) or involve special 
circumstances (e.g. golden shares). It can be passive, even if a government holds (directly or indirectly) more than 
half of the shares. “SOE” should therefore be read accordingly -- and it draws attention to the need for research on 
this matter. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The country classification follows UNCTAD, ibid. 
 
More specifically, research on the 200 largest non-financial MNEs identified by UNCTAD for 
20106 yields 49 SOEs that are MNEs (see the supporting tables below). The 2010 foreign assets7 
of these 49 together account for US$ 1.8 trillion, with US$ 1.1 trillion in aggregate foreign 
revenue. Of these 49: 
 
 23 were at least 50% owned directly or indirectly by states; their foreign assets were US$ 
570 billion. 
 If the state ownership threshold is lowered to 10%, 26 more firms are added; their foreign 
assets were US$ 1.16 trillion. 
 
20 of the 49 SOEs are headquartered in developed countries and 29 in emerging markets, with 
foreign assets of US$ 1.4 trillion and US$ 0.4 trillion, respectively. They operate in many 
sectors.8 
 
Thus, SOEs are among leading players in the world FDI market. They are more numerous 
among the leading MNEs headquartered in emerging markets, but the foreign assets of those 
headquartered in developed countries are considerably higher than those of the SOEs from 
emerging markets. 
 
FDI by SOEs is likely to grow further. For example, in the case of China -- in 2010 the world’s 
fourth largest outward investor in terms of flows (not counting Hong Kong) -- SOEs control the 
bulk of the country’s growing outward FDI; one prediction is that Chinese firms will invest US$ 
1-2 trillion abroad over the coming decade.9 To that, one would have to add the likely growth of 
FDI by SWFs. 
 
Not surprisingly, regulatory attention has begun to focus on FDI by SCEs. It is fueled by the 
concern that SCEs may pursue objectives other than commercial interests10 (and therefore might 
constitute a national security risk for host countries) and that they receive benefits from their 
governments that put them into a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their private counterparts.11 To 
address the first concern, especially developed countries have passed laws or clarified 
regulations that foresee special treatment for SCEs, creating a separate class of foreign investors. 
An example is the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of the United States: it 
establishes a presumption that an investigation needs to be undertaken by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States if a merger or acquisition in the United States is 
undertaken by a SCE. (It remains to be seen to what extent this kind of distinction is permitted in 
                                                        
6 Ibid. The firms researched were the 100 largest non-financial MNEs globally and the 100 largest non-financial 
MNEs headquartered in emerging markets, ranked by foreign assets. 
7 “Foreign assets” of MNEs are the current and fixed assets abroad that they control. They are usually much larger 
than their outward FDI. 
8 The three most important are: natural resources (12); telecommunications (10); utilities (6). 
9 Thilo Hanemann and Daniel Rosen, “Chinese FDI in the United States is taking off: How to maximize its 
benefits?,” Columbia FDI Perspective, No. 49, October 24, 2011, p. 2. 
10 See Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, eds., Sovereign Investment: Concerns and 
Policy Reactions (New York: OUP, forthcoming). 
11 However, non-SCE MNEs also receive a range of benefits. 
 
light of international investment law.) The second concern has given rise to a discussion of 
“competitive neutrality.” 
FDI can make an important contribution to economic growth and development. There is no 
systematic evidence that such investment by SCEs cannot make the same contribution that 
private firms can make. The special treatment that seems to be emerging for these entities needs 
to be watched carefully, including from the perspective as to what extent such a fragmentation in 
the treatment of a certain class of foreign investors serves the broader and longer-term purposes 
of a non-discriminatory international investment law regime. 
The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the following acknowledgment: “Karl P. 
Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss, ‘State-controlled entities control nearly US$ 2 trillion in foreign assets,’ 
Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 64, April 2, 2012. Reprinted with permission from the Vale Columbia Center on 
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Table 1. Non-financial MNEs with 50% or more government ownership stake, 2010a 
    




















Électricité de France France Utilities 321,431 165,413 86,311 33,737  158,842  54,924 84.51% French State 
Vattenfall AB Sweden 
Electricity, gas and 
water 
80,694 54,013 29,632 22,606  40,363  30,994 100% Swedish State 
Statoil ASA Norway Natural resources 109,728 50,927 87,144 19,315  30,344  11,506 
67% Norwegian 
State 




Malaysia Natural resources 145,099 38,787 76,822 34,817  40,992  8,198 
100% Malaysian 
State 














27,151 22,557 11,814 7,616  23,000  10,417 
54.46% Singaporean 
State 
Qatar Telecom Qatar 
Telecommunication
s 
23,335 18,355 6,600 5,054  1,900  1,495 55% Qatar State 
Petroleo Brasileiro 
SA 
Brazil Natural resources 200,270 14,914 115,892 28,709 76,919 7,967 66% Brazilian State 















China Natural resources 325,327 11,594 178,343 4,732 1,585,000  29,877 100% Chinese State 
Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation 
India Natural resources 37,223 10,447 21,445 2,912  32,826  3,896 74.14% Indian State 













10,847 8,958 3,719 1,936  25,000  21,250 
97.72% Malaysian 
State 










Offshore Oil Corp. 
China Natural resources 75,913 6,648 30,680 4,898  51,000  1,739 100% Chinese State 






China Construction 41,444 3,580 50,501 3,265  209,103  20,426 100% Chinese State 
China Minmetals 
Corp. 






5,341 2,192 6,516 4,915  11,498  3,608 
68% Singaporean 
State 
 TOTAL     2,056,015 569,857 996,353 316,468 3,052,599 464,878   
                                                        
Source: The authors, based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011), annual 
reports, financial registration documents, company corporate websites, and Thomson Worldscope database. 
a
 Whenever available, the table reflects the government’s share of voting rights. However, due to lack of information, the table uses in some cases shares in capital or other 
variables as reported by the companies (sometimes, however, it is unclear what variables are being used). Note, moreover, that recent information (especially on MNEs based in 
emerging markets) could not be obtained for all of the 200 firms contained in the sample, particularly as far as indirect ownership is concerned. Thus, there may be additional 
firms among the 200 that should be included in table 1 and/or table 2. Moreover, as a rule only state ownership stakes by the government of the country in which a MNE is 
based are reported here (and not ownership shares of foreign government entities, e. g. via SWFs). In some cases, government ownership may be temporary, and in some cases, 
the data refer to earlier or later years. 
Table 2. Non-financial MNEs with 10-50% government ownership stake, 2010b 























Germany Automobile 266,426 167,773 168,046 130,030  388,000  210,000 
20% German 
State 




Electricity, gas and 
water 
224,548 121,415 95,289 54,538  78,313  40,930 
31.24% 
Italian Stated 





Germany Telecommunications 170,780 104,342 82,677 46,560  252,494  103,230 
32% German 
State 
Eads Netherlands Defense 111,153 69,931 60,599 54,742  121,691  76,111 
22.4% 
SOGEADEf 












Electricity, gas and 
water 
68,829 52,721 46,075 29,482  317,034  216,194 
13.74% 
French State 




Deutsche Post Germany 
Transportation, 
shipping and storage 




Renault France Automobile 93,676 32,476 51,617 34,800  122,615  68,352 
17.86% 
French State 




Zain Kuwait Telecommunications 19,863 19,019 8,054 6,833  13,000  12,447 
49.2% 
Kuwaiti State 
Tata Steel Ltd India 
Metal and metal 
products 













Construction and real 
estate 











9,397 9,161 3,926 3,926  68,416  68,379 
10.37% 
Chinese State 











Sappi Limited South Africa 
Wood and paper 
products 
7,297 4,788 5,369 4,190  16,427  9,046 
11.9% South 
African State 
Lenovo Group China 
Electrical and 
electronic equipment 
















Construction and real 
estate 
6,221 3,377 5,976 3,494  32,000  17,372 
15% Kuwaiti 
State 
ZTE Corp. China 
Telecomcomunication 
and manufacturing 






China Wholesale trade 4,155 2,669 8,032 5,652  29,479  18,935 
35.06% 
Chinese State 
TOTAL   2,015,186 1,161,024 1,203,176 738,997 2,946,988 1,563,331  
 
                                                        
Source: The authors, based on UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2011), annual 
reports, financial registration documents, company corporate websites, and Thomson Worldscope database. 
b
See footnote a of table 1. 
c
 The French State holds one golden share. 
d
 The Italian government also has some “special powers”.  
e
  The Italian government also has some “special powers.” 
f
 SOGEADE is 50% owned by SOGEPA, a wholly state-owned French enterprise. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
g
 The Brazilian government holds directly 5.6% of Vale’s capital via BNDESPAR, a wholly-owned subsidiary of BNDES; Valepar, which is controlled by independent pension funds 
of government-controlled companies (especially Banco do Brasil, Petrobras and Caixa Economica Federal) holds another 34.1% of the capital. The government also holds 12 
golden shares that entitle it to veto certain actions in certain areas. 
h
 Of which Government Employees Pension Fund owns 13.3% of ordinary shares. 
i
 36% of Legend is held by the Chinese State. 
j
 53.97% of Telenor held by the Norwegian State.  
